Turning Tides
Navigang the Evolving World of Cybercrime
H1 2023
CRIMEWARE TRENDS
AND HIGHLIGHTS
AUGUST | 2023
In the rst half of 2023, Arete observed several
disnct trends and shis in the cyber threat landscape.
Leveraging the data collected during each incident
response engagement, we can see the rise and fall of
ransomware variants, notable trends in ransom demands
and payments, industries targeted by ransomware
aacks, and what may be coming next.
Looking back over the past few years, Arete has
seen a paern of acon-reacon developing within
cybersecurity. In response to several high-prole aacks
in the past three years, many organizaons invested
in security tools, training, and services to reduce risk.
To evade these standard security tools and common
defense strategies, threat actors shied their operaons
to target dierent types of operang systems with
increasingly complex taccs.
The threat landscape connues to evolve with the
widespread introducon of AI tools, lower barriers
of entry into cybercrime, new vulnerabilies, and the
socioeconomic eects of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Ransomware operaons thriving today are pushing the
envelope in development and extoron techniques.
Arion, reorganizaon, and re-branding within
cybercriminal groups have made aribuon more
challenging than ever.
However, as threat actors evolve, so do the threat
hunters and organizaons tracking them. Global
law enforcement agencies have carried out several
impacul arrests and seizures on mulple high-prole
cybercriminal groups in the rst half of 2023. We have
seen a signicant increase in collaboraon between
law enforcement agencies and civilian cybersecurity
organizaons, resulng in unprecedented informaon
sharing on indicators and taccs, allowing for more
accurate aribuon, restoraon, and potenal
disrupon of ransomware threat actor acvies.
Execuve Summary
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
3



Mainstay actors prevail and new players arrive on the scene
Professional services is the most targeted industry
The percentage of incidents where a ransom is paid fell to 19%
Cybercrime-as-a-Service on the rise
Leaked source code skyrockets accessibility
Arcial Intelligence changes the game
Threat actors move to exltraon-only operaons
Targeng of Linux and macOS systems increases aack surface
Cascading eects of the Russia-Ukraine War connue
Global law enforcement targets cybercriminals
* Disclaimer: Unless otherwise noted, all data within this report is based on Arete incident response cases.
Overview
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
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       


In the rst half of 2023 (H1 2023), we saw LockBit rise to the top spot, accounng for 30.3% of Arete’s observed
ransomware cases. New variants appeared on the scene, including Akira and Luna Moth. Despite the emergence
of new variants over the past two years, Arete data indicates that dominant and well-established actors sll
maintain their top posions.
H1 2023 Highlights From Aretes
Incident Response Cases
Figure 1: Top Ransomware Variants Observed in H2 2022 and H1 2023
0%
20%
30%
10%
ALPHV/BlackCat
Phobos
Hive
Lockbit
Black Basta
Royal
Bian Lian
29.87%
14.29%
12.99%
12.99%
9.09%
7.79%
6.49%
H2 2022
0%
10%
20%
5%
15%
ALPHV/BlackCat
Lockbit
Black Basta
Royal
Akira
Luna Moth
Phobos
18.71%
12.90%
6.45%
H1 2023
18.71%
12.90%
12.26%
6.45%

H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
5
Figure 2 shows the top ransomware variants observed over the past 4 quarters and is color-coded according to
each variant’s current state of acvity.
LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat retained spots in the top
three over the past four quarters, showcasing their
connued dominance. Lockbit has made connuous
development eorts throughout its tenure, including
improvement to its ransomware builder, releasing
new builders to their aliates, and working to target
other operang systems. Lockbit can now target
Linux systems, and a developmental Lockbit macOS
encryptor was spoed in the wild. Arete has observed
updated versions of LockBit, including LockBit Green
and LockBit Black.
BlackCat ulizes a unique method requiring command
line arguments to encrypt les on vicm systems.
To aid in propagaon, the group uses stolen admin
credenals together with the embedded PsExec ulity,
eliminang the need to propagate the ransomware
manually. This, together with addional techniques
and benets to aliates, could contribute to its
ongoing status as one of the top three most prevalent
threat actor groups.
Another variant observed over the past three quarters
is Royal ransomware, which, like BlackCat, requires
command line arguments to run correctly in a vicm
system. Royal has been acve since September 2021
and was rst observed in an Arete engagement during
Q4 2022. In Q1 2023, we observed a spike in cases,
but the frequency subsequently dropped in Q2.
In Q2 2023, we observed the emergence of Akira,
a new ransomware group that quickly became the
number two most observed variant. In June 2023, a
cybersecurity rm released a free Akira decryptor
requiring unencrypted and encrypted le pairs to
decrypt correctly. We expect to see Akira release an
updated version of their ransomware, eliminang the
aw that allowed the creaon of the free decryptor.
However, like some other ransomware operaons,
they may decide to move to an extoron-only model
at some point.
See page 10 for taccs, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),
and detailed insights on the top ve variants observed.
H1 2023 Highlights From Aretes
Incident Response Cases
Figure 2: Top Ransomware Variants Observed from Q3 2022 to Q2 2023
Q3 2022 Q4 2022 Q1 2023 Q2 2023
ALPHV/BlackCat ALPHV/BlackCat
ALPHV/BlackCat ALPHV/BlackCat
Luna Moth
CI0p
Luna Moth
Phobos
Phobos
Phobos
Phobos
Black Basta Black Basta
Black Basta
Royal
Royal
Lockbit
Lockbit
Lockbit Lockbit
Akira
Hive
Hive
Vice Society
BianLian
BianLian BianLianMakop
DARK BLUE
INACTIVE
LIGHT BLUE
STEADY OR DECLINING ACTIVITY
PINK
TRENDING UP
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6
H1 2023 Highlights From Aretes
Incident Response Cases
In the rst half of 2023, Arete saw a disnct rise in
targeng against the professional services sector, an
almost 12% increase from the second half of 2022.
This is primarily due to the rise in acvity from the
extoron group Luna Moth, which disproporonately
targeted law rms. Luna Moth's acvity subsequently
declined in the second half of Q2, and we expect to see
a decrease in the targeng of the professional services
sector in Q3 due to Luna Moth's drop in acvity.
Interesngly, from the various industries we track in our
data, the top ve industries impacted by ransomware
stayed the same from the second half of 2022 to the
rst half of 2023. These industries have each retained
a spot in the top ve since 2019. Organizaons in
these industries oen house valuable data, including
customer informaon, intellectual property, nancial
records, and operaonal secrets that threat actors can
exploit for monetary gain or compeve advantage.
These industries also consist of crical operaonal
facilies like manufacturing plants, hospitals, and
transportaon networks that may make them more
willing to pay ransoms to restore operaons and avoid
disrupon. These industries will likely remain in the
top ve as threat actors connue to follow the money
and leverage their successful experience in aacking
these organizaons.

Figure 3: Top 5 Industries Impacted by Ransomware in H2 2022 and
H1 2023
Professional Services
Manufacturing
Public Services
High Technology
Healthcare
Industries
11%
15%
24%
23.66%
26%
12%
14%
16%
19.82%
38%
H2 2022
H1 2023
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
7
While the overall ransom demands from cybercriminals
connue to trend upwards, Arete's data shows that a
ransom was paid in just 19% of cases in the rst half
of 2023. This may be due in part to the industry-wide
increase in exltraon-only aacks.
Arete has also enhanced our ability to restore clients to
normal operaons without ransom payments. Arete's
restoraon engineers build tailored restoraon and
remediaon plans for our clients. These tailored plans
allow Arete to assess the impact of a ransomware event
properly, determine the validity of the organizaon's
backups, idenfy recoverable data via means other
than backups, and create a meline for restoraon.
This data-driven analysis helps create the best path
forward and oen eliminates the need to pay a ransom.
The facilitaon of a ransom payment is always a last
resort for Arete, and we are proud to have avoided the
need for our clients to pay a ransom in over 80% of our
cases this year.
Ransom Demands and Payments
The facilitaon of a ransom payment is
always a last resort for Arete, and we are
proud to have avoided the need for our
clients to pay a ransom in over 80% of our
cases this year.
$600,000
Percentage of me a ransom is paid
19%
H2 2022
H1 2023
29%
Median Ransom Demand
$302,000
H2 2022
H1 2023
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
8
Inial Access Vectors
The rst half of 2023 saw a shi in dominant inial
access vectors. Notably, third-party access tools
accounted for 34.5% of inial access in the second half
of 2022 and just 9.3% in H1 2023. Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP) held the top spot in H1 2023, observed
in 24.5% of cases, up from just 8.1% in H2 2022.
A primary contributor to these shis is threat actors'
increased use of inial access brokers. Inial access
brokers always pursue the latest vulnerabilies,
taccs, and tools. As their role in the cyber ecosystem
connues to expand, we will likely see frequent shis
in which vectors are used most oen.
For detailed informaon about these inial access
vectors, see the appendix.
Figure 4: Inial Access Vectors Observed in H2 2022 and H1 2023
Soware / Hardware Vulnerability
Third Party Remote Access Tools
Stolen User Credenals
Malicious Email
Remote Desk Protocol
Method of Intrusion
Soware / Hardware Vulnerability
Third Party Remote Access Tools
Phishing Email
Malicious Email
Remote Desk Protocol
Virtual Private Network
Method of Intrusion
H2 2022
8.05%
12.64%
34.48%
36.78%
H1 2023
9.26%
11.11%
12.96%
24.07%
20.37%
36.78%

The following list represents the post-exploit toolsets
our analysts observed in incident response and
managed detecon and response engagements in H1
2023. Documentaon and analysis of malware help us
understand cyberaacks' nature, scope, and impact
during an invesgaon. This insight can give network
defenders a more accurate picture of the threat
landscape and help them understand how to reduce
the risk of a signicant incident by ensuring their
endpoint and network appliances properly detect and
block these threats.
For informaon about each of these toolsets, please
see the appendix.
Inial Access Vectors
Agent Tesla Gozi RedLine
AZORult Hancitor SocGholish
Babadeda IcedID Smoke Loader
BlueFox Jupyter SystemBC
Brute Ratel Metasploit Vidar
Cobalt Strike Mimikatz WSH RAT
CoinHive Neshta XMRig
Emotet NETSupport RAT Xtreme RAT
Expiro PoisonIvy Xworm
FlawedAmmyy RAT Qbot Zloader
FloodFix Quasar RAT



9
| ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
10
Notable Taccs, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
LockBit aliates use various tools during intrusions
to achieve network reconnaissance, remote access,
credenal dumping, and exltraon. Aliates
also use batch scripts, PowerShell, Metasploit,
and Cobalt Strike to gain inial access and move
laterally through a vicm’s network to idenfy and
target high-value assets for encrypon.
In LockBit 3.0, ransom notes tles were changed
from ‘Restore-My-Files.txt’ to ‘[id].README.txt.
LockBit 3.0 has leveraged the iControl CVE-
2021-22986 and Fornet CVE-2018-13379
vulnerabilies, enabling remote code execuon
on a system or le downloads containing sensive
informaon, including usernames or passwords,
without authencaon.
In a recent case, Arete idened LockBit ulizing
double encrypon for the rst me.
In several recent LockBit cases, Arete idened
mulple ransomware notes in client environments,
raising concerns over the plausibility of decrypon.
Despite these concerns, the threat actor was able
to successfully decrypt the les in cases with
mulple ransom notes idened.
In a recent case, Arete observed a change with
the decrypon tool provided by the threat actor,
which required the tool to be deployed ulizing the
command line. In previous cases, the decrypon
tool was easily deployed by running the tool as an
administrator. This seems to be an isolated incident,
and we have not seen any further changes in the
threat actors decrypon tool.
Threat Actor Insights

LockBit has remained at the forefront of the cybercrime
sector over the last several years due to its constant
development eorts and connued iteraons of its
ransomware encryptor. The group commonly ulizes
a double-extoron technique and, in some cases, even
triple extoron, in which they launch DDoS aacks on
the vicm’s network. Addionally, they leverage a data
leak site (DLS) for posng vicm data. Operaonally,
LockBit members recruit experienced aliates tasked
with gaining inial access to vicm networks in
exchange for a percentage of the paid ransom. The
LockBit 3.0 ransomware is connuously evolving, and
in April 2023, samples designed to encrypt on Apple’s
macOS arm64 architecture were discovered on Virus
Total, which raised concerns about the evolving risk of
ransomware on macOS systems. Lockbit 3.0 is already
capable of encrypng on Windows, Linux, and VMware
ESXi virtual machines and aims to expand the group of
potenal targets to include organizaons migrang to
virtual environments.
Lockbit 3.0 is already capable of encrypng
on Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi virtual
machines and aims to expand the group of
potenal targets to include organizaons
migrang to virtual environments.


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11

ALPHV/Blackcat emerged in late 2021, targeng
organizaons across various sectors and regions.
ALPHV/Blackcat diers from other variants because
it has unique features and techniques that make it
more challenging to detect and stop. It is known to
distribute various payloads, including Cobalt Strike,
Trickbot, and Qakbot. The group has demonstrated
connuous innovaon, regularly incorporang new
discovery techniques, defense evasion, and various
post-compromise acvies.
ALPHV/Blackcat diers from other variants
because it has unique features and techniques
that make it more challenging to detect and stop.
Notable Taccs, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
Tools used by BlackCat, according to Arete's
incident response engagement datasets, include
CobaltStrike, Mimikatz, Megasync, LaZagne, and
WebBrowserPassView.
Based on command line switches seen in Windows
and Linux variants, Arete notes that BlackCat
builds vicm-specic samples.
ALPHV/Blackcat uses various entry points to
infect the vicm's network, including phishing
emails, compromised credenals, and remote
desktop protocol (RDP) brute force aacks.
It also ulizes other malware infecons as stepping
stones to launch its ransomware payload.
To increase potenal reach and impact, ALPHV/
Blackcat targets both Windows and Linux devices,
as well as network-aached storage (NAS)
devices, which are oen used to store backups
and sensive data.
Threat Actor Insights
According to a threat assessment by Arete's Threat
Fusion Center, Black Basta uses various methods to
aack its vicms, including:
Sending phishing emails that contain malicious
aachments or links that download and run Black
Basta's soware
Using stolen passwords or hacking tools to access
the vicm's network remotely
Dropping an image le named dlaksjdoiwg,jpg that
replaces the desktop wallpaper
Using encrypon techniques to lock the vicm's
data and hide their acvies
Installing the GHOSTRAT remote access trojan to
execute the payload

Black Basta emerged in late 2021 and oen ulizes
a double extoron technique. Black Basta is a
cybercriminal organizaon that oers Ransomware-as-
a-Service (RaaS) to other hackers, meaning that anyone
can use Black Basta's soware and infrastructure to
launch ransomware aacks and share the prots with
Black Basta's operators.
Black Basta is a cybercriminal organizaon
that oers Ransomware-as-a-Service to other
hackers, meaning that anyone can use Black
Basta's soware and infrastructure to launch
ransomware aacks and share the prots with
Black Basta's operators.
Threat Actor Insights
| ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
12

Royal ransomware has been acve in the cybercrime
ecosystem since September 2021. Rather than
operang as a RaaS, which has recently dominated the
threat landscape, Royal is believed to loosely operate
as a closed group. When the group emerged, it ulized
other variants' data encryptors before developing
its proprietary encryptor. While the group does not
appear to target a single sector or organizaonal
size disproporonately, they do not shy away from
encrypng large organizaons with ransomware.
While Royal does not appear to target a single
sector or organizaonal size disproporonately,
they do not shy away from encrypng large
organizaons with ransomware.
According to a threat assessment by Arete's Threat
Fusion Center, Royal uses various methods to aack its
vicms, including:
Sending phishing emails that contain malicious
aachments or links that download and run Royal
ransomware's soware
Using stolen passwords or hacking tools to access
the vicm's network remotely
Using malicious adversements that redirect the
vicm to a website that downloads and runs Royal
ransomware's soware
Deploying CobaltStrike to maintain persistence on
a system
Exltrang credenals, laterally spreading across
the system's domain, and encrypng devices
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
13
Threat Actor Insights

            


Akira encrypts and exltrates data to a remote
server and extorts vicms by threatening to post
sensive informaon on their data leak site.
Akira
The rst ransomware aack by Akira occurred in early
April 2023, and the group quickly amassed vicms
throughout the rst half of 2023. Akira encrypts
and exltrates data to a remote server and extorts
vicms by threatening to post sensive informaon
on their data leak site (DLS). The ransomware appends
a ".akira" extension to encrypted les and uses a
password-protected TOR site for communicaon and
negoaons with its vicms.
Notable Taccs, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
According to Arete's incident response
engagement data, Akira targets educaon,
professional services, retail, hospitality, healthcare,
and manufacturing organizaons.
To date, Akira has primarily targeted enes in
Canada and the United States.
Arete has observed Akira oen using the same
verbiage during negoaons. The threat actor
sends a list of the ve deliverables they will provide
aer payment, including decrypon assistance and
evidence of data removal, along with an opon to
pay for all ve of the deliverables listed or just
some of them. Aer payments are made, Arete
has observed Akira sending the same "security
report" regardless of the vicm.
The decryptor Akira provides is known to be
unreliable and problemac, randomly skipping les
or decrypng a le without removing the .akira
extension. In late June 2023, researchers at Avast
developed a decryptor for Akira and released it
as a public download. Arete assesses that Akira
will likely adjust its encrypon schema to migate
future vicms' ability to use this public tool.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
14
Opening the Floodgates:
Lower Barrier of Entry into Cybercrime

In September 2021, a Babuk aliate leaked the group's
C++ source code, giving emerging actors an eecve
tool for targeng Linux operang systems and paving
the way for VMware ESXi aacks. While originally
slow to be adopted, in the rst half of 2023, a slew of
emerging threat actors used the source code to target
Linux environments. These threat actors include:
• TRM Locker • RA Group
• Rook • Lock4
• Dataf Locker

In February 2022, a Con aliate disgruntled by
the group's stance on the Russia-Ukraine war leaked
the ransomware operaon's informaon, including
negoaons, hierarchy, and source code. Following
these leaks, the group inevitably ceased operaons,
and the individuals behind Con ransomware
joined other ransomware groups or stood up their
own operaons. The leaked source code has been used
to enable various ransomware operaons, including:
Pun Team ransomware
Scarecrow ransomware
BlueSky ransomware
               
            


The well-known Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model has dominated the cybercrime industry over the last
few years and into H1 2023, and Cybercrime-as-a-Service has grown in parallel. Cybercrime-as-a-Service has
lowered the barrier of entry into cybercrime by giving threat actors access to various resources that allow them
to work their way through the aack lifecycle eecvely.
The threat actors behind ransomware operaons can:
Engage with inial access brokers to purchase access to vicm organizaons.
Leverage exploit code purchased from vulnerability marketplaces.
Purchase access to remote access trojans (RATs).
Purchase access to post-exploitaon command & control (C2) frameworks.
Opt or buy into an exisng ransomware aliate program.
Cybercrime-as-a-Service has led to a disnct increase in inial access brokers and credenal shops and has
increased the ability of even inexperienced actors to exploit vicm organizaons eecvely.

               


Opening the Floodgates:
Lower Barrier of Entry into Cybercrime

Following the leaked Con source code, an angry
LockBit developer leaked the group's builder in
September 2022. The leak allowed aspiring cyber-
criminals to easily download the builder, alter the
ransom note to their liking, and encrypt vicm
environments, as long as they gained inial access.
The builder's ease of access and granularity enabled
many unknown actors to target vicms in the
wild without sophiscated capabilies. However,
one large ransomware group, dubbed Bl00dy
ransomware, connues using the builder throughout
their campaigns.
The addion of these leaked tools into the cyber-
crime ecosystem empowered emerging actors to
create their own ransomware operaons rather
than becoming an aliate for an exisng group.
This inux of new actors has increased diculty in
aribuon following a security incident. Arete has
developed an extensive repository of threat actor
TTPs, and detecon mechanisms, including Yara and
SennelOne countermeasures, to detect and aribute
threat actor acvity. However, actors cannot wholly
rely on leaked source code to enable their operaons,
as it is the nal stage of the aack lifecycle.
Arete has developed an extensive repository
of threat actor TTPs, and detecon
mechanisms, including Yara and SennelOne
countermeasures, to detect and aribute
threat actor acvity.
15
| ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
16
The AI Revoluon and Cybercrime

ChatGPT, the revoluonary product from OpenAI,
encompasses a large dataset of human conversaons
and can generate and address human-like responses.
Since its launch in January 2023, it has garnered
massive global aenon and grown signicantly. A
free version is available for all users, but OpenAI also
launched a paid version with unrestricted availability.
Although ChatGPT has filters intended to prevent
the tool from generating harmful content, users
have discovered workarounds and methods to
bypass these filters and leverage the tool to enable
cybercrime operations. Because of its immense
capabilities, ChatGPT has become a preferred
tool for script kiddies and attackers. It can assist
in identifying vulnerabilities, reverse-engineering
shellcode, and even generating code for malware.
Multiple threads in underground forums have
addressed the utilization of ChatGPT for fraudulent
activities. In a hacking forum called 'Breached,'
Arete has observed discussions among threat
actors regarding the use of ChatGPT in creating and
sharing malware code.


Discovered by cybersecurity rm SlashNext on July
13, 2023, WormGPT is a blackhat version of ChatGPT.
It is designed to generate malicious content, including
phishing emails, malware code, fake news, and
social media posts. WormGPT is based on the GPT-J
language model, developed in 2021 by EleutherAI,
an open-source AI research group. Depending on the
user's input and preferences, the tool generates texts
in dierent languages, formats, and styles and creates
code snippets for various programming languages,
including Python, Java, C#, PHP, and HTML.
WormGPT is described on dark web forums as a
"sophiscated AI model" and a "best GPT alternave
for blackhat" designed especially for cybercrime.
WormGPT has no ethical boundaries or safety
mechanisms to prevent it from responding to harmful
or illegal requests and is allegedly trained with data
sources, including malware-related informaon. Sll,
the specic datasets remain known only to WormGPT's
author. This tool poses a severe threat to online
security and privacy, as it can create convincing texts
that can trick users into revealing sensive informaon,
downloading malicious soware, or falling for scams.
This new and emerging threat requires more research
and analysis to understand its full capabilies and
potenal impacts.
Cyber criminals can leverage AI tools to create phishing
scams, social engineering aacks, and spamming. In the
near term, it is likely that new versions of AI soware
will connue to be developed, leading to increasing
funconality for threat actors. This, coupled with
threat actors connuing to expand their knowledge
of manipulang the soware, will lead to threat actors
increasingly ulizing AI in their day-to-day operaons.
Because of its immense capabilies, ChatGPT
has become a preferred tool for script kiddies
and aackers.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
17


Historically, threat actors have leaned heavily on their
reputaons to inmidate their vicms. And while
actors like LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat connue
to be mainstays, the ease of rebranding has caused
new and lesser-known actors to place less emphasis
on their reputaon. Groups can easily create new
ransom notes and encrypted le extensions using
ransomware builders, build new communicaon
infrastructure, and create new logos for their
branding. This rebranding trend could lead to false
claims, unreliable proof-of-deleon, or re-extoron.

As Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operations
connue to be plagued by dissased or sloppy
aliates, we will likely see a shi in the RaaS-
dominated cybercrime ecosystem. Inially, RaaS
groups will likely emphasize veng aliates before
onboarding. Large ransomware operaons could
use their resources to eecvely create a veng
and onboarding process comparable to that of top-
er human resources departments. Addionally,
threat actors will likely consider using new tools to
develop their own ransomware operaon rather
than becoming an aliate of an exisng RaaS. Even
inexperienced actors could use tools, including
arcial intelligence, inial access brokers, commodity
RATs, and leaked ransomware source code, to create
their own ransomware operaon without signicant
development capabilies.
Rebranding trends could lead to false claims,
unreliable proof-of-deleon, or re-extoron.
The AI Revoluon and Cybercrime
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
18
     







Acve since March 2022, Luna Moth launched
phishing campaigns impersonang popular online
learning plaorms Zoho MasterClass and Duolingo.
The phishing emails claim that the recipients have
been charged for a subscripon and oer a PDF
aachment with a phone number to call for more
informaon. If the recipients open the aachment and
call the number, they are greeted by a human operator
who pretends to be a customer service representave
and convinces them to install a remote administraon
tool (RAT) on their device. This RAT gives the aacker
complete control over the device and allows them to
access and exltrate any data available.
Luna Moth does not use any sophiscated or custom-
made tools but rather leverages commercially available
RATs, including Atera, Splashtop, Syncro, and AnyDesk,
as well as publicly available tools SoPerfect Network
Scanner, SharpShares, and Rclone. These tools are
stored on compromised machines under false names
to avoid detecon. The group also uses VPN services
and TOR to hide their identy and locaon.
Once Luna Moth steals the data, they contact vicms
via email or phone and demand a ransom, usually
ranging from $100,000 to $1 million, depending on
the amount and sensivity of the data. They threaten
to publish the data on their website or sell it to other
criminals if the ransom is not paid within a specic
meframe. The group also provides proof of the
data breach by sending samples of the stolen les or
screenshots of their website.
Luna Moth’s aacks are simple but eecve, exploing
human psychology and trust rather than technical
vulnerabilies. The group targets small and medium-
sized businesses that may not have adequate security
measures or backups in place and may be more
likely to pay a ransom to avoid reputaonal damage
or legal consequences. The group also operates
opportuniscally, stealing any data they can access,
regardless of its value or relevance.
Luna Moth’s novel extortion campaign demonstrates
that cyberattacks do not require ransomware to
be successful.
The Migraon to Exltraon-Only Operaons
Luna Moth’s aacks are simple but eecve,
exploing human psychology and trust
rather than technical vulnerabilies.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
19


A serious ransomware threat is looming over
crical infrastructure, as cybercriminals linked to
notorious Russian ransomware group Cl0p are
exploing a security aw in MOVEit Transfer, a tool
used by hospitals, health systems, corporaons,
and government agencies to share large les over
the internet. Cl0p, also known as TA505, has been
using a structured query language (SQL) aack
vector to infect internet-facing MOVEit Transfer web
applicaons with malware and then steal data from
underlying databases.
The MOVEit vulnerability was disclosed by U.S.-
based company Progress Soware, the developer of
MOVEit Transfer, on June 5, 2023. The exploitaon
of the vulnerability has aected several organizaons
worldwide, including Brish Airways, the BBC, Boots,
Ofcom, Transport for London, Ernst & Young, and
several U.S. federal agencies. Cl0p has released the
names of several vicms and some of their stolen data
on its website since June 13, 2023, in an aempt to
pressure these organizaons to pay ransom demands.
This aack is known as a supply-chain aack, as it
targets widely used soware that serves as a gateway
to many other organizaons. The MOVEit aack is
a remote code execuon aack in which aackers
can exploit and upload a webshell to exltrate data
from vulnerable servers. This vulnerability is one of
the latest examples of ransomware groups becoming
more sophiscated and aggressive in their taccs,
targeng crical infrastructure and sensive data.
There was no data encrypon during these aacks.
Instead, Cl0p was able to exltrate large amounts of
data from vicm organizaons eecvely. Following
the mass exltraon of data, Cl0p extorted the vicms
of the MOVEit aack via direct emails and posngs on
their DLS. This series of cyberaacks is an example of
the trending shi to exltraon-only operaons.
The Migraon to Exltraon-Only Operaons
The MOVEit vulnerability is one of the latest
examples of ransomware groups becoming
more sophiscated and aggressive in their
taccs, targeng crical infrastructure and
sensive data.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
20
Ransomware aacks have been a signicant threat to
Windows and Linux users for years, but macOS users
have largely avoided this threat thanks to Apple’s
security features and lower market share. However,
in 2023, a new ransomware threat on macOS was
discovered, indicang that the threat landscape may
be changing for Apple users.
The ransomware showcasing the ability to target
macOS environments was later aributed to the
notorious LockBit ransomware group. In April 2023,
security researchers found samples of LockBit
encryptors for macOS on VirusTotal, a malware
analysis repository. The samples were uploaded in
November and December 2022 but went unnoced
unl MalwareHunterTeam spoed them.
The LockBit encryptors for macOS were designed to
target both newer Macs running Apple processors
(arm64 architecture) and older Macs running
PowerPC chips. However, the researchers found
that the encryptors were not very eecve, as they
were unsigned, did not account for Apple’s security
restricons (TCC/SIP), and had bugs that caused
them to crash. The encryptors also did not have any
network communicaon or ransom note funconality.
The researchers concluded that the LockBit
encryptors for macOS were more of an experiment
than a viable threat. Sll, LockBit could improve
and iterate on these tools in the future. The fact
that LockBit was developing a macOS version of its
ransomware could signal a trend toward more Mac-
targeted ransomware, especially as more businesses
and instuons adopt Macs.
LockBit was not the only ransomware group to show
interest in macOS in 2023. In May 2023, ransomware
group Akira was found to have published data from a
macOS vicm on its website. Akira uses a combinaon
of phishing emails, remote access tools, and PowerShell
scripts to compromise and encrypt devices.
These incidents suggest that macOS users should not
be complacent about the risk of ransomware aacks.
While macOS has some built-in security features
that make it harder for ransomware to run, such as
Gatekeeper, FileVault, and XProtect, these features
are not foolproof and can be bypassed by determined
aackers. Moreover, macOS users may be more
vulnerable to phishing emails and social engineering
taccs, as they may have a false sense of security and
lower awareness of cyber threats.
Ransomware aacks are a severe threat to any device
user, regardless of the operang system. MacOS
users should not assume they are immune from this
threat but rather take proacve measures, like those
on page 26, to secure their data and devices from
ransomware aackers.


             

Focus on Increasing Aack Surface
Ransomware aacks are a severe threat to
any device user, regardless of the operang
system.

H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
21

Over the past two years, cybercriminals have targeted
VMware ESXi servers due to a soware vulnerability
known as CVE-2021-21974, with over 3,200 servers
compromised globally.
A ransomware variant dubbed ESXiArgs appeared to
be the rst to leverage the vulnerability to run exploit
code remotely. ESXiArgs was inially idened as
encrypng les with the .vmxf, .vmx, .vmdk, .vmsd,
and .nvram extensions on compromised ESXi servers
and creang a .args le, but recently the group started
encrypng more extensive amounts of data.
Arete observed the latest version of Royal
Ransomware specically targeng VMware ESXi
virtual machines. Addionally, LockBit released a
new iteraon of their ransomware builder, allowing
threat actors to target Linux environments acvely.
This new variant, LockBit Green, allows ransomware-
as-a-service (RaaS) aliates to encrypt VMware ESXi
hypervisors.
Threat actors are likely targeng the ESXi machines
because, aer the deployment of the payload, they
can encrypt mulple hosts via a single command.
Arete observed the latest version of Royal
Ransomware specically targeng VMware
ESXi virtual machines.
Focus on Increasing Aack Surface
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
22
Ironically, along with increasing risks of mobilizaon,
Russian hackers are now facing uncertainty about the
country's "safe haven" status that they enjoyed so far.
War-related expenses and the economic impact of
imposed sancons prompted the Russian government
to propose a new law that enables the conscaon of
proceeds from cybercriminal operaons.
The mass exodus of cybercriminals from Ukraine
and Russia also provided a unique opportunity for
internaonal law enforcement agencies to track
and arrest cybercriminals in countries that have
extradion treaes with the United States. Since the
beginning of the war in Ukraine, several high-prole
arrests have been announced publicly, including
suspected JabberZeus top manager Vyacheslav "tank"
Penchukov and a suspected "Evil Corp" second-in-
command Igor Turashev.
As a result of increased law enforcement acon, we
have seen an inux of cybercriminal groups deciding
to break up into smaller independent teams or
re-brand in the rst half of 2023. Every month, some
groups disappear (or announce "rerement), and
"new" groups enter the market, which has increased
the challenge of accurate aribuon.
With rising mul-dimensional pressure on cyber-
criminal groups, we'll likely connue to observe the
shi from large Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and
private groups toward compartmentalized cellular
structure operaons, which enable smaller teams to
operate independently while making the enterprise
more resilient to idencaon and inltraon.
The cellular structure can make it harder for these
groups to coordinate large-scale acons, and there's
a greater risk of cells being inltrated or turning
against each other. Nevertheless, it has proven to be
eecve for many cybercriminal organizaons. In the
long run, this structural change may also slow down
the speed of innovaon since smaller cells will be less
likely to have sucient resources to make signicant
investments in research and development.
The Connued Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War
on Cybercrime
As a result of increased law enforcement
acon, we have seen an inux of
cybercriminal groups deciding to break up
into smaller independent teams or re-brand
in the rst half of 2023.






H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
23
The increase in high-prole ransomware events
led Congress to form CISA's Joint Ransomware
Taskforce (JRTF). In November 2022, the White
House sponsored the second Internaonal Counter
Ransomware Iniave Summit.

Hive, a notorious ransomware gang that targeted
dozens of organizaons worldwide, including
hospitals, schools, and businesses, faced a signicant
blow from law enforcement agencies. In coordinaon
with internaonal partners, the FBI seized the website
Hive used to communicate with its vicms and publish
stolen data. More than 30 global private sector and
U.S. government agencies contributed to the success
of this operaon.
The website, hosted on the dark web, displayed a
message from the FBI in January 2023 announcing it
had been seized as part of an ongoing invesgaon.
The message also warned that anyone who accessed
the website may have been exposed to malware and
advised them to scan their devices for infecons.
The FBI stated that it took acon against Hive aer
idenfying its infrastructure and obtaining a court
order. The agency also said it is working with foreign
law enforcement agencies to idenfy and apprehend
the individuals behind Hive.
One of Hive’s most notable aacks was against
Memorial Health System, a hospital network in
Ohio and West Virginia, in August 2021. According
to Aorney General Merrick Garland, the aack
forced the hospital to turn away paents as Covid-19
surged. Other vicms of Hive include Canadian
energy company Inter Pipeline, soware provider
Kaseya, and Iowa-based agricultural cooperave New
Cooperave.
The seizure of Hive’s website is part of a broader
eort by the U.S. government and its allies to
combat the growing threat of ransomware, which has
caused signicant disrupon and damage to crical
infrastructure and public services.
2021
REvil aacks against the world's
largest meat processor, JBS, and
soware company Kaseya, impacted
over 1,500 businesses worldwide.
2021
Hive aack against the Memorial
Health System, a hospital network in
Ohio and West Virginia, forced
hospitals to turn away paents as
Covid-19 surged.
2021
Darkside aack against Colonial
Pipeline significantly impacted fuel
supply that is said to have increased
prices in the U.S. by $3 for the first
me in seven years.
2023
Vice Society aack against Los
Angeles Uniffed School District, the
second-largest school district in the
United States.
High-profile Ransomware Aacks
Law Enforcement Acons Against Cybercriminals

           


H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
24

In collaboraon with law enforcement agencies
from 18 countries, the FBI cracked down on Genesis
Marketplace, one of the largest illicit marketplaces for
stolen credenals and related sensive informaon.
The operaon, which took place on April 27, 2023,
resulted in the arrest of 119 suspects and the seizure
of over $1.5 million in cryptocurrency and cash.
Genesis Marketplace was a dark web plaorm
specializing in selling digital ngerprints, which are
data collecons that idenfy a users device and
online behavior. The data included browser cookies,
IP addresses, user-agent details, device IDs, operang
system informaon, and login credenals for various
online services.
Genesis Marketplace had over 350,000 digital
ngerprints listed for sale, ranging from $5 to $200.
The plaorm also had over 250,000 login credenals
for various online services, including email, banking,
social media, gaming, and e-commerce. The plaorm
claimed to have over 55,000 acve users and generated
over $100 million in revenue since its incepon in 2017.
The market oered its customers a browser extension
that allowed them to impersonate the vicms whose
digital ngerprints they purchased. The customers
could then access the vicms’ accounts without
triggering security alerts or vericaon processes.
Genesis Marketplace also provided its customers with
tools to create their own digital ngerprints and sell
them on the plaorm.
The FBI said it iniated the invesgaon into Genesis
Marketplace in 2019 aer receiving a p from a
condenal source who provided access to its backend
server and database, which contained evidence of the
plaorm’s operaons and transacons. The FBI was
able to idenfy and locate the suspects involved by
tracing their online acvies and transacons. They
obtained search warrants for several locaons and
seized various devices and documents related to
Genesis Marketplace.
The FBI coordinated with law enforcement agencies
from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the
United Kingdom, and Uruguay to execute the operaon.
The FBI stated that the operaon was a signicant step
in disrupng and dismantling Genesis Marketplace and
its infrastructure. The agency also said it is commied to
protecng consumers and businesses from cybercrime
and holding cybercriminals accountable.
Due to the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanconing
Genesis Marketplace for its part in stealing and selling
device credenals and related sensive informaon,
it has been added to Aretes Sanconed and Restricted
Malware/Enes List.
Law Enforcement Acons Against Cybercriminals
The FBI coordinated with law enforcement
agencies globally to disrupt and dismantle
Genesis Marketplace and its infrastructure.
H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
25
On May 9, 2023, the U.S. government executed a
successful operaon to disrupt and disable a covert
cyber espionage network operated by Russias Federal
Security Service (FSB). The FSB used the network,
dubbed Snake, to collect sensive intelligence from
high-priority targets worldwide, including government
networks, research facilies, and journalists.
Snake is considered the most sophiscated cyber
espionage tool in the FSB’s arsenal, employing
stealthy host components and encrypted network
communicaons. Snake also uses a peer-to-peer (P2P)
network of infected computers to relay operaonal
trac to and from the FSB’s ulmate targets, making
it harder to detect and trace.
The operaon, codenamed MEDUSA, was a joint
eort by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Invesgaon
(FBI), and the Naonal Security Agency (NSA). The
agencies leveraged their unique authories and
capabilies to idenfy, analyze, and disrupt Snake’s
infrastructure and operaons.
The operaon involved several steps:
The CISA issued a Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)
to provide network defenders with technical
informaon and migaon recommendaons
on Snake.
The FBI obtained court orders to seize
domains and servers used by Snake as part of
its P2P network.
The NSA provided intelligence and technical
experse on Snake’s acvies and targets.
The FBI created and deployed a tool called
PERSEUS, designed to disable Snake’s malware
on compromised computers in the U.S.
The CISA coordinated with internaonal
partners to share informaon and assistance
on Snake.
The operaon resulted in the disrupon of Snake’s
P2P network, the removal of Snakes malware from
hundreds of computers in the U.S., and the exposure
of Snakes targets and techniques. The agencies also
warned that Snake may sll pose a threat and urged
network defenders to remain vigilant and apply the
recommended migaons.
The operaon demonstrates the U.S. government’s
commitment and ability to counter malicious cyber
acvity from foreign adversaries. It also showcases
the importance of collaboraon and informaon
sharing among federal agencies and internaonal
partners. The agencies stated they will connue to
monitor and respond to any aempts by the FSB or
other actors to reconstute Snake or launch new
cyber operaons against the U.S. or its allies. Global
law enforcement agencies coming together to combat
cybercrime showcases their connued eorts to
disrupt cybercrime around the world.
Global law enforcement agencies coming
together to combat cybercrime showcases
their connued eorts to disrupt cybercrime
around the world.
Law Enforcement Acons Against Cybercriminals

H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
26
The barrier of entry into cybercrime is lower than
ever, and along with these mainstay actors, Arete also
expects to see an inux of new or re-branded groups
as they move away from the aliate model towards
a more cellular structure. Emerging threat actors
will likely leverage arcial intelligence, inial access
brokers, commodity RATs, and leaked ransomware
source code to build their own operaons without
needing support from large aliate programs.
The connued downstream impact of the Russia-
Ukraine War has caused a shi in the cybercrime
ecosystem that Arete expects to connue throughout
the rest of 2023. In response to disgruntled
aliates and increased law enforcement acon,
cybercriminals seek to deect risk and disguise their
taccs to become increasingly elusive.
Arete also expects global governments and law
enforcement agencies to connue their successful
eorts in targeng cybercriminals. As threat
actors benet from an inux of new tools and
technologies, so do threat hunters and network
defenders. Organizaons are increasingly priorizing
cybersecurity as a risk management issue and
becoming more resilient against cyber threats, and
Arete is commied to helping organizaons migate
and respond to cyber incidents.
To increase cyber resiliency and secure data and
systems, Arete recommends that organizaons consider
implemenng the following proacve measures:
Regularly update security soware and patch
against vulnerabilies.
Limit user privileges to the least access required
to complete job requirements.
Conduct end-user training to educate
employees on common social engineering
techniques.
Implement an XDR (Extended Detecon and
Response) tool like SennelOne to detect
ransomware and other malware threats.
Ulize an aack surface management toolset
to enumerate externally facing infrastructure
and idenfy associated vulnerabilies.
Conduct annual penetraon tesng to idenfy
security gaps and weaknesses.
Remain informed about the latest ransomware
trends and techniques.
Dene an Incident Response Plan to streamline
recovery from ransomware aacks.
What to Expect






H1 2023 CRIMEWARE TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS | ©2023 Arete Advisors, LLC. All Rights Reserved.
27
Disclaimer: Unless otherwise noted, all data within this report is based on Arete incident response cases.
hps://securityscorecard.com/research/deep-dive-into-ALPHV-blackcat-ransomware/
hps://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/09/lockbit-builder-leaked-by-disgruntled-developer
hps://intel471.com/blog/lockbit-3-0-builder-code-leak-points-to-another-disgruntled-criminal-employee
hps://www.sennelone.com/anthology/akira/
hps://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/05/09/akira-ransomware-is-bringin-88-back/
hps://blog.cyble.com/2023/06/28/akira-ransomware-extends-reach-to-linux-plaorm/
hps://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/the-con-leaks-a-case-of-cybercrimes-commercializaon
hps://cybernews.com/news/pun-team-ransomware-emerges-from-leaked-cons-source-code/
hps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9153425
hps://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bluesky-ransomware/
hps://techmonitor.ai/technology/cybersecurity/babuk-source-code-ransomware-malware
hps://www.jusce.gov/opa/pr/us-department-jusce-disrupts-hive-ransomware-variant
hps://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/
hps://www.sennelone.com/blog/LockBit-for-mac-how-real-is-the-risk-of-macos-ransomware/
hps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-039a
hps://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/04/i-seizes-bot-shop-genesis-market-amid-arrests-targeng-operators-
suppliers/
hps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-129a
hps://decoded.avast.io/threatresearch/decrypted-akira-ransomware/
hps://www.cisa.gov/joint-ransomware-task-force
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/01/fact-sheet-the-second-
internaonal-counter-ransomware-iniave-summit/
hps://www.cnet.com/personal-nance/crypto/a-meline-of-the-biggest-ransomware-aacks/
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